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Recent studies show that Theory of Mind (ToM) has implications for children’s
social competences and psychological well-being. Nevertheless, although it is well
documented that children overall take advantage when they have to resolve cognitive
problems together with a partner, whether individual difference in ToM is one of the
mechanisms that could explain cognitive performances produced in social interaction
has received little attention. This study examines to what extent ToM explains children’s
spatial performances in a dyadic situation. The sample includes 66 boys and girls
between the ages of 5–9 years, who were tested for their ToM and for their competence
to resolve a Spatial task involving mental rotation and spatial perspective taking, first
individually and then in a dyadic condition. Results showed, in accordance with previous
research, that children performed better on the Spatial task when they resolved it with a
partner. Specifically, children’s ToM was a better predictor of their spatial performances
in the dyadic condition than their age, gender, and spatial performances in the individual
setting. The findings are discussed in terms of the relation between having a conceptual
understanding of the mind and the practical implications of this knowledge for cognitive
performances in social interaction regarding mental rotation and spatial perspective
taking.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), which is the ability to understand the nature, origins,
and consequences of the mind (beliefs, intentions, desires, feelings, etc.) in the self and others,
has been investigated extensively (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001; Shahaeian et al., 2011; Harris et al.,
2016). However, much less is known about the implications of ToM for children’s social and
cognitive development (e.g., Harris, 2006; Grüneisen et al., 2015). On one hand, recent studies
have shown that children’s ToM is positively associated with their overall prosocial behaviors and
social competences (Caputi et al., 2012; Roazzi et al., 2013; Farina and Belacchi, 2014). On the other
hand, the implications of ToM for children’s cognition has received less attention and the findings
are typically inconsistent (Meins et al., 2006; Veneziano et al., 2008; Guajardo and Cartwright,
2016). Furthermore, albeit it is well documented that on a range of cognitive problems children
obtain better performances when solving these together with a partner (e.g., Doise and Mugny,
1984; Tversky and Hard, 2009), to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed the degree
to which individual differences in ToM can account for cognitive problem resolving performances
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in dyadic settings. In light of the particular reliance on
collaborative task performances in the awaiting and modern
academic and vocational life, understanding whether
collaborative tasks depend on individual abilities can have
both practical and pedagogical implications. The present study
therefore aims to investigate whether ToM can explain children’s
performance in a dyadic spatial transformation task which
demands the cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the
coordination of different viewpoints.
When the term ‘theory-of-mind’ was originally introduced, it
was thought of as the competence to attribute mental states to self
and others, involving the ability to theorize about others’ mind
by making inferences regarding mental phenomena (Premarck
and Woodruff, 1978). It was thus recognized as a socio-cognitive
skill enabling human beings to predict, explain and manipulate
others’ actions and representations. Traditionally, false-belief
tasks, based on the attribution of a mistaken belief, have
been central in assessing children’s ToM capacities (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983). Today, however, it has become more and
more common to consider ToM through a wider lens; not
only involving the understanding of belief and knowledge, but
also encompassing the competence to conceptually understand
intentions, desires, and emotions (e.g., Astington, 2001; Wellman
et al., 2001; Pons et al., 2004; Dunn, 2006; Shahaeian et al.,
2011).
The first studies in the ToM field presented strong evidence
for the progress children obtain between 3 and 5 years of age
on classical false-belief, appearance-reality, and Level-2 visual
perspective taking tasks (Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell, 2004).
Albeit important milestones in ToM development occur in the
preschool years, the knowledge about mental states continues
to increase later on (Flavell, 2004). Research has shown that
from infancy to adolescence, ToM develops from a “peripheral
and superficial” understanding of rather visible or non-reflective
dimensions of the mind (e.g., recognition of basic emotions,
understanding of first order false-beliefs and impact of desires on
emotions) to a more “central and deeper” understanding of more
invisible or reflective dimensions of the mind (e.g., understanding
of moral and mixed emotions, of second order false-beliefs and
double-bluffs; Pons et al., 2009).
Different directions of research emerged from these early
works on trends in ToM development. These studies have been
exploring, for instance, antecedents that might contribute to ToM
development, intra and intercultural differences, and real world
consequences of ToM abilities (e.g., Flavell, 2004; Shahaeian et al.,
2011). It is well documented that ToM development depends on
many social and cognitive factors, such as language, intelligence,
executive function, attachment, and relationships with peers (e.g.,
Cutting and Dunn, 2006; Pons et al., 2014). Recent studies have
also found positive impacts of ToM on social competences at
the ages of 3–6 years and psychological well-being at the ages
of 8–12 years (e.g., Farina and Belacchi, 2014; Bender et al.,
2015). However, the implications of understanding mental states
for children’s cognition remain unclear. For instance, Veneziano
et al. (2008) found that 6–7 year-olds with higher ToM test
scores were better able to express epistemic states when they
narrated a story. A longitudinal study conducted by Guajardo
and Cartwright (2016) tested children at 3–5 years and later at
6–9 years and showed that those who had better understanding of
other’s perspectives were more aware of their thoughts involved
in reading. Lecce et al. (2010) found the same results in a study
assessing children between 9 and 10 years of age. On the other
hand, Meins et al. (2006) argue that between 6 and 9 years
of age, having ToM capacities, measured through conceptual
tasks, is different from being able to use it either to narrate a
book or to describe friends. Likewise, Guajardo and Cartwright
(2016) showed that false-belief understanding did not contribute
uniquely to reading comprehension. Together, this suggests at
least two gaps when it comes to understand the role of ToM
for children’s cognition. First, previous studies do not cover a
broad measure of ToM that also includes the understanding of
desires and emotions; and second, there is still a need to explore
other cognitive dimensions potentially influenced by ToM in
school-aged children that go beyond the use of mental terms and
reading comprehension. One such dimension is the performance
on cognitive tasks completed together with peers.
Studies on the impact of ToM on cognitive performances in
dyadic interaction are rare, and have especially focused on false-
belief reasoning and the process (rather than the outcome) of
cooperation. If on one hand it has been shown that ToM works
as a powerful social tool that facilitates children’s interactions
with peers (Moore and Frye, 1991), it remains unclear whether
ToM has implications for the cognitive outcome produced in
social interaction. For instance, Grüneisen et al. (2015) recently
found that 6-year-olds could use first and second order false-
beliefs to coordinate actions with peers, showing that recursive
mind-reading is an important component of dyadic interaction.
Similarly, Flobbe et al. (2008) demonstrated that 8–10 year-olds
passing a second order false-belief task are able to apply this
when playing a strategic game with a peer. Curry and Chesters
(2012) showed that adults scoring lower on a self-report measure
of autistic traits and understanding of other’s minds were also
less successful at coordinating their behaviors with others in
coordination games. These researchers subsequently called for
studies using a broader range of ToM measures to investigate
the impact of children’s understanding of the mind on their
performances in dyadic settings. Investigating how children solve
a spatial transformation task in a dyadic situation might be
particularly relevant in this context because it requires both the
cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the adoption of the
spatial perspective of someone else (Kessler and Thomson, 2010).
Spatial abilities comprise activities such as perception of
horizontality, mental rotation of objects, or location of simple
figures within complex figures (Linn and Petersen, 1985).
Specifically, spatial transformation demands the ability to
mentally rotating objects and making transformations in their
positions based on a specific referential mark (Hegarty and
Waller, 2004). Piaget and Inhelder (1952) focused in particular
on one aspect of spatial relations called “coordination of
perspectives,” which refers to the ability to identify the appearance
of an object as something dependent on the spatial position from
which they are viewed. Based on the classical “three mountains
task,” they found that children younger than 6 years locate objects
with respect to their own points of view, and it is only between 7
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and 9 years of age, when children reach the concrete operational
stage, that they would be aware of other perspectives than their
own and thus deal with an external frame of reference (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1952). Spatial relations, therefore, comprises both
the cognitive process of projecting relationships between objects,
and the social process of understanding the relation between
two different perceptions, as exemplified by the “If I were in
your place I would see what you see” line of thinking (Fishbein
et al., 1972). Flavell et al. (1981) claimed that even under the
age of 3, children recognize that people can perceive different
objects at the same time (Level-1 perspective taking) but they
have difficulties with recognizing that they can see the same
object from different perspectives (Level-2 perspective taking).
This more sophisticated ability is likely to be developed around
5 years of age. Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992), for instance,
tested children between 3 and 9 years of age and found that
children as young as 5 years can take the spatial perspective of
others when the task does not entail conflict between two frames
of reference.
The Piagetian paradigm presented strong evidence for the role
of socio-cognitive conflicts on the development of coordination
of perspectives. In the “three mountains task,” children have to
visualize themselves in a different position and these conflicting
representations within the individual promote a breakdown
in the cognitive equilibrium that boosts a reinterpretation of
the object (Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012). However, in the “three
mountains task,” the perceptions were not confronted by
someone else. Doise and Mugny (1984) contributed enormously
to this issue by considering the spatial coordination not only as
an intra-individual process but also as an inter-individual one.
Based on a critical review of Piaget and Inhelder’s (1952) work,
they proposed a series of experiments where the coordination of
real viewpoints could take place. They tested children between
5 and 8 years of age in a spatial transformation problem called
“The reconstruction of the village task,” involving both an
individual and a dyadic condition. The findings demonstrated
a positive impact of peer collaboration on spatial performances
as children progressed on the task after they have worked with
a partner. The authors argue that when solving a spatial task
individually, children have to create intra-individual cognitive
conflicts to envision and derive at different solutions, and that
this could be less powerful than collaborative settings where the
inter-individual conflict and the mutual action context promote
subsequent individual progress. Moreover, it could be more
effective if each member of the dyad has access to only one part
of the resources needed to complete the task (Buchs and Butera,
2004). In a recent study, Zapiti and Psaltis (2012) applied the
same “village task” used by Doise and Mugny and tested children
between 6.5 to 7.5 years of age to analyze the impact of interaction
types on task performance. They found that the pair composition
in terms of the children’s gender and spatial knowledge affected
the expression of point of view and the type of the socio-cognitive
conflict that emerged. In a meta-analysis on gender differences
in spatial ability, Linn and Petersen (1985) demonstrated how
gender relates to spatial performance by showing that males are
better than females in mental rotation problems and that the
magnitude of this difference is smaller in spatial visualization.
The authors also pointed out that the impact of gender might vary
depending not simply on the task type but also on the age range
of the participants (e.g., Voyer et al., 1995; Yilmaz, 2009).
Thus, even though previous research has demonstrated a
positive impact of peer collaboration on spatial performances
both with children and adults (Doise and Mugny, 1984;
Tversky and Hard, 2009), more studies are needed in order
to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
spatial performance in dyadic settings. Because the “village task”
demands the cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the
coordination of different viewpoints, they can be particularly
fruitful for the purpose of examining whether broader ToM
capacities play a role in children’s spatial performance in social
interaction. Therefore, the current study addresses two main
questions: (1) whether children improve their performance
when resolving a spatial transformation task with a partner
as compared to alone; (2) and to what extent children’s
achievements on ToM tasks explain their spatial performances in
a dyadic setting. The reasons for focusing on a dyadic setting are
twofold: the need to understand potential mechanisms related to
individual differences in dealing with spatial problems in social
interaction; and the intention to explore the impact of ToM on
an advanced cognitive problem, as the performance in the dyadic
condition implies not only mental rotation of objects but also the
coordination of different hands on spatial perspectives.
One could argue that the village task is a perspective taking
problem in itself, so why investigate whether ToM impacts
another perspective taking task? First, in this study ToM is
not measured based solely on perspective taking ability but
as a broad competence including the understanding of beliefs,
desires, and emotions (e.g., Shahaeian et al., 2011). Moreover,
the “village task” cannot be reduced to its perspective taking
dimension. Different from the “three mountains” (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1952) and other classical perspective taking tasks, such
as the picture and turtle tasks (Masangkay et al., 1974), in the
dyadic version of the “the village task” a child can be confronted
by the other, so that both children have to deal with two socio-
cognitive operations at the same time: (1) the mental rotation
of the objects based on an external frame of reference; (2) the
perspective of the other child about the position of the objects in
relation to the referential mark. When confronted with another
spatial representation, the child is challenged to make some
changes in his own spatial representation, and as Gopnik and
Astington (1988) suggested, it is much easier to ignore your
own contradictions than ignore the contradictions between your
own representation and the representation of others. Previous
studies have shown that adopting others’ perspectives remains
cognitively demanding even for adults, especially when the
perspectives are conflicting (Keysar et al., 2000; Epley et al.,
2004; Qureshi et al., 2010). Surtees et al. (2011) tested adults
and children between 6 and 11 years of age and found that
those who succeed on direct tasks of Level-2 perspective taking
showed no evidence of this competence when it was measured
in an indirect task where the participants where not explicitly
asked about what the partner was seeing. This is also the case
with the “village task” in which the participants are encouraged
to work together but there is no explicit question about the
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perspective of the other, though the children need to coordinate
their spatial representations to find the solution to the problem.
Consequently, we are not applying two simple perspective
taking tasks. In addition, the aim is not to assess whether
ToM and spatial performance are related competences, but to
examine specifically to what extent the performances on classical
ToM tasks with different levels of complexity and where the
child attributes mental or emotional states to a character in
a fictional scenario (without being confronted with another’s
perspective) can explain the variation in spatial performances
in an interactional scenario where the spatial representation of
one child can be confronted by that of the other child. In other
words, does a broad conceptual knowledge about the mind have
implication for children’s cognition in the domain of a dyadic
spatial task?
In accordance with previous studies, the first hypothesis is
that children perform better on the Spatial task in the dyadic
setting compared to when doing it by themselves, even when
we consider age and gender. Because resolving the Spatial task
together with a partner depends on mental rotation of objects
and understanding of the other’s point of view, the second
hypothesis is that children’s ToM has a positive impact on spatial
performances in the dyadic version of the task, even after taking
into account age, gender, and the performance in the individual
condition. We expect the results to contribute to the fields
of ToM development and social development in at least three
ways: by consolidating previous results showing that children
take advantage from dyadic setting when resolving a cognitive
problem; by originally informing on the role of individual
differences in ToM on children’s spatial performances in a
dyadic setting (illuminating potential mechanisms underpinning
spatial abilities in social interactions); and by pointing out a link
between conceptual understanding of the mind and its practical
implications on children’s cognitive performance in the domain
of spatial transformation abilities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Initially, 120 parents were contacted through two middle-class
private schools in Recife (Brazil). The parents of 90 children
(75% of the invited) signed a consent form that informed on
the study aims and procedures, allowing their children to be
asked to participate. Subsequently, all children invited agreed
to participate in the study. The Norwegian Social Science Data
Service and the Ethic Committee in Brazil approved the project.
To avoid floor and ceiling effects, children who did not succeed
on the simplest item in the individual condition of the Spatial task
(n = 14), as well as those who achieved the maximum score in
the individual setting (n = 10) were excluded from the sample
(Doise and Mugny, 1984). This ensured that the children could
have the same minimum level and that they could also progress
on the task. There were equal number of boys and girls among
those who failed on the first item and 12 children in the youngest
group. Amongst the children who achieved the maximum score,
four were girls, six were boys, and all of them were in the oldest
group. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Doise and
Mugny, 1984), as younger children failed more often than the
older ones and only children in the oldest group achieved the
maximum score. Thus, the final sample included 66 typically
developing children (32 boys; 34 girls) between 5 years 7 months
and 9 years 8 months (M = 89.94 months; SD = 13.09 months)
with Portuguese as their native language. In order to obtain
more variation in terms of ToM competence (the younger group
with ToM in progress and the other with well-established ToM),
children were divided into two groups according to their age
(n = 36 in the Younger group: 5;7–7;5 years; n = 30 in the
Older group: 7;6–9;8 years). Because we wanted to facilitate that
children would work together – and because asymmetry in terms
of knowledge and gender might create competitive relationship
instead of collaboration (Buchs et al., 2004; Sommet et al., 2015) –
the dyads consisted of children of the same gender, similar age,
from the same classroom, and with similar performances on the
individual version of the Spatial task (SD = 0.84) and the ToM
tasks (SD= 2.19). For the same reason, we wanted to ensure that
the children in the dyads were neither best friends nor not friends,
so that information from the children’s ranking of their friends in
the classroom was also used when composing the dyads.
Procedure, Tasks, and Scoring
The data collection consisted of three sessions carried out at
the children’s schools. In the first session, the children were
tested individually on the Spatial task. In the second session,
the children completed the ToM tasks, and in the third and last
session, they participated in the dyadic version of the spatial
problem. Each session lasted around 10 min, with an average
interval of 15 days between each session.
Spatial Task
Children were first tested individually in an adapted version
of the spatial transformation task “the reconstruction of the
village,” developed by Doise and Mugny (1984) and derived from
Piaget’s famous “three mountains” task (Piaget and Inhelder,
1952). The task material included a miniature village placed on
a model cardboard (50 cm by 50 cm), which was fixed on a
table, and comprised a lake (the referential mark) and three or
four houses (i.e., based on task complexity, which is described
below) with different colors and marked with doors on one side.
On a different table, offset 90◦ from their left, children could see
another cardboard also marked with a lake on it. They received
three or four houses equivalent to the ones previously placed by
the researcher on the model cardboard, and they were instructed
to make a similar village. In order to emphasize the referential
mark, the experimenter said that if a man comes out of the lake,
he would find the houses in the same positions as the ones in
the model constructed by the experimenter. Chairs were placed
in such a way that the children could not move beyond a limited
area.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the task. There were four
different items with increasing complexity. The simplest item had
three houses with no rotation required. The second demanded
a rotation of 90◦ and an inversion of the left-right and front-
back orders of the houses. The third and fourth items had four
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FIGURE 1 | Spatial task.
houses and both required 180◦ rotations and inversions of the
left-right and front-back orders. After the completion of each
item, children were oriented to move to the opposite side of
the cardboard to check whether or not they wanted to make
changes to their villages. When solved individually, this part of
the procedure generated an intra-individual cognitive conflict, as
the child could look at the same village from different perspectives
(Doise and Mugny, 1984).
The same four items were applied in the dyadic condition,
but in this situation children were placed in different face-to-
face positions (position X and position Y in Figure 1). This
required them to coordinate their viewpoints to make a copy
of a village, which entails an inter-individual cognitive conflict,
as it involved looking at the same village from different angles
(Doise and Mugny, 1984). To make sure that one child would
not act alone, the dyadic condition operated with interdependent
resources (Buchs and Butera, 2004), so that each child received
only a certain number of houses (either one or two) and were
only allowed to touch and move their “own” houses. To move
the houses of the “other” child, the children had to convince
the partner to do this, providing opportunities for negotiations
within the dyad.
The same scoring method, based on the original work of
Doise and Mugny (1984), was applied for both the individual
and dyadic conditions. The children first got a spatial score for
each item of the Spatial task. Children showing no compensation
(NC) got 0 points. They did not manage to mentally rotate the
cardboard and just reproduced the perceptual tableau that they
were able to observe without making any inversion regarding
the position of the houses. Children who displayed partial
compensation (PC) received one point, meaning that they
achieved one of the inversions required, either the right-left
order or the front-back order, but not both. Children who
demonstrated total compensation (TC) got two points, and
this involved correct transformation of both dimensions (left-
right and front-back) simultaneously. Subsequently, in both
conditions, a total sum score was calculated from the points on
the four items, therefore could vary from zero to eight in each
condition of the spatial task. Because two dyads did not reach an
agreement regarding the resolution of the problem, the score was
computed for each child separately in both conditions. Thus, the
score in the dyadic setting represents an individual result of the
social interaction.
Theory of Mind Task
Children were tested individually for their ToM with items
extracted from the Theory of Mind Test (TMT; Pons and Harris,
2002), and the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC; Pons and
Harris, 2000). Both tests are the result of an extensive review
of the developmental literature and of a selection of the most
common tasks used to assess children’s ToM. Giménez-Dasí et al.
(2016) have also combined these two tests to obtain a broad
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measure of ToM. However, the authors used a short version
of the two tests by reducing the number of items and keeping
all the components. In addition, they applied the tests in two
separate sessions. Because we had an extensive data collection,
we applied the TEC and the TMT in the same session which,
in turn, required the exclusion of some components. This was
a strategy to ensure that the children would be concentrated
and motivated during the assessment, and reducing the number
of items would still make the tests very lengthy. Moreover,
more items per component should be more reliable than fewer
items within more components. Thus, based on the review of
the literature which focuses on ToM as an understanding of
multiple concepts rather than a single task paradigm (e.g., Pons
et al., 2004; Wellman and Liu, 2004; Blijd-Hoogewys et al.,
2008), we selected components that did not overlap and that
represented different levels of difficulty. Children were therefore
assessed for their perspective taking (two items in Level 1
and one item in Level 2), understanding of false-belief (three
items), understanding of second-order false-belief (three items),
recognition of basic emotion (five items), understanding of the
impact of situational variations on emotions (five items), and
understanding of desire-based emotion (two items). This choice
avoided the tests to become too long, but warranted the inclusion
of both visible or non-reflective dimensions of the mind and
more invisible or reflective dimensions of the mind (Pons et al.,
2009). For each item, the examiner showed a drawing while
reading a story regarding the depicted characters, and the child
was asked to attribute either a cognitive or an emotional mental
state to the main character of the story by pointing to one
of two or four possible answers. A composite score ranging
from 0 to 21 was calculated by summing the number of correct
items.
Statistical Analyses
SPSS Statistics 22.0 was used for all analyses in the current
study. First, preliminary analyses assessed the performances on
the ToM tasks by age and gender through analysis of variance.
Subsequently, the first hypothesis was examined through a
mixed between-within-subjects analysis of variance to assess
the impact of age, gender, and condition (individual and
dyadic) on the performance in the Spatial task. To test the
second hypothesis, correlation analysis and regression analysis
were performed to assess the impact of ToM in explaining
the variation on children’s spatial performance in the dyadic
condition, while accounting for age, gender, and individual
spatial performance.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the performances at the ToM tasks and at the
Spatial task (individual and dyadic conditions) by age and gender.
An analysis of variance Age X Gender indicated a significant
and large effect of age on ToM performances (F(1,62) = 10.91,
p = 0.002, η2 = 0.15), but no significant effect of gender or
interaction between gender and age. Regardless of gender, older
children had higher ToM performances than younger children.
TABLE 1 | Theory of Mind (ToM) by age group and gender and Spatial
Performance by condition, age group and gender.
Spatial performance ToM
Age
group
Gender n Individual condition
M (SD)
Dyadic condition
M (SD) M (SD)
Younger Boys 18 3.1 (1.0) 4.7 (2.2) 17.6 (1.5)
Girls 18 2.5 (0.85) 4.2 (1.3) 17.2 (1.6)
Older Boys 14 3.1 (1.0) 4.4 (2.7) 18.4 (1.6)
Girls 16 2.8 (0.71) 6.8 (1.7) 18.9 (1.2)
Total 66 2.9 (0.96) 5.0 (2.2) 18.1 (1.6)
First Hypothesis
An analysis of variance Age X Gender X Condition showed a
moderate effect of age (F(1,62) = 4.72, p = 0.034, η2 = 0.07), a
large effect of condition (F(1,62) = 65.29, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.51),
and no effect of gender on children’s performances on the Spatial
task. The older children had higher performances (M = 4.3;
SD = 1.7) than younger children (M = 3.7, SD = 1.6), regardless
of condition and gender. Moreover, children had higher
performances in the dyadic condition (M= 5.05, SD= 2.23) than
in the individual condition (M = 2.92, SD = 0.96), regardless
of age and gender. There was also an interaction effect of
moderate size between age and gender (F(1,62)= 7.90, p= 0.007,
η2= 0.011), indicating that older girls performed better (M= 4.8,
SD = 2.3) than older boys (M = 3.79, SD = 2.5), regardless
the condition. An interaction of moderate effect size between
gender and condition (F(1,62) = 6.62, p = 0.012, η2 = 0.10)
furthermore showed that girls were better than boys in the dyadic
setting, whereas there were no significant gender differences in
the individual condition. Finally, a moderate interaction effect
was found between condition, age, and gender (F(1,62) = 6.09,
p= 0.016, η2 = 0.09), suggesting that older girls obtained higher
scores than younger girls and they were better than boys from
both age groups in the dyadic version of the Spatial task, but not
in the individual condition.
Second Hypothesis
Correlation analysis showed that ToM performances correlated
with the spatial performances both in the individual (r = 0.26,
n = 66, p < 0.038) and in the dyadic (r = 0.39, n = 66,
p < 0.001) conditions, even when we control for age and gender
(r = 0.26, n = 66, p < 0.038 and r = 0.32, n = 66, p < 0.010
for the individual and dyadic conditions, respectively). In the
regression analysis, the role of age, gender, spatial performance
in the individual condition, and scores in the ToM tasks for
the performances on the Spatial task in the dyadic condition
were examined. This regression model (Multiple R = 0.45,
F(4,61) = 3.81, p < 0.008) showed that the predictors explained
in total 20% (R2 = 0.20) of the variation in the dependent
variable. When examining the impact of the different predictors,
ToM (b = 0.31; t = 2.4, p < 0.020), but not age, gender, nor
spatial performance in the individual condition, had a significant
effect on the spatial performance in the dyadic condition. ToM
accounted for 15% of the shared variance (r= 0.39) and explained
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alone 8% (r = 0.29) of the variance of the children’s performance
in the dyadic Spatial task.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to investigate: (1) whether children
improve their performance when resolving a Spatial task with
a peer; and (2) whether individual differences in ToM affect
children’s spatial performances in a dyadic setting. In line with
prior research (Doise and Mugny, 1984; Psaltis and Duveen,
2007), we found that children improved their performance on
the Spatial task when they resolved it together with a partner
compared to when resolving it alone. For the first time, this study
showed that children’s performances in a dyadic Spatial task were
predicted by their ToM, even when accounting for age, gender,
and the children’s spatial performances on the same task in an
individual condition.
Spatial Performances Across Age,
Gender, and Condition
Confirming our first hypothesis, children performed better in the
dyadic compared to the individual setting. This is consistent with
the original experiments carried out by Doise and Mugny (1984)
and other studies showing that children between 5 and 9 years
of age profit from resolving tasks with a partner (e.g., Psaltis
and Duveen, 2007; Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012). It has been argued
that such results demonstrate that inter-individual conflicts are
central for children’s cognitive development, and that this is
particularly happening when children work on complementary
resources to resolve problems (Buchs and Butera, 2004). The
current study extends prior results on spatial problems that
have reported beneficial effects of social interaction on cognitive
performances in samples of older children and adults (Teasley,
1995; Tversky and Hard, 2009). One potential explanation is
that the non-verbal and verbal behaviors of the other support
the understanding of the objects and their spatial relations, so
that the mutual action context promoted by social interaction
helps children to (re-)think about the activity from the other’s
perspective (Tversky and Hard, 2009; Frick and Wang, 2013).
As has been suggested earlier in the field (Piaget and Inhelder,
1952), the effect of age on children’s overall spatial performance
indicates that spatial ability follows a developmental trend.
The absence of an effect of age on spatial performance when
children resolved the task by themselves might be related to
the way we divided the groups. According to the literature, it
is typically somewhere between the ages of 7 (younger group)
and 9 (older group) years that children start to imagine an
orientation outside their body, and work with relations such as
before/behind and left/right (Piaget and Inhelder, 1952; Yilmaz,
2009). The enhanced performance of older compared to the
younger children in the dyadic condition could be related to the
higher reliance on more advanced social and linguistic abilities in
this setting (Siegal, 2008).
The fact that gender had no main impact on children’s overall
spatial performance contrasts with previous work that found that
males perform better than females on mental rotation problems
(Voyer et al., 1995; Yilmaz, 2009). However, this gender difference
in mental rotation seems to appear from the age of 10, and
could possibly be related to boys having more experiences with
manipulation of symbolic information than girls by that age.
Thus, gender differences may occur as the children gets older,
which might explain the interaction effect between age and
gender showing that older girls were better than younger boys,
independent of the condition. Indeed, the literature suggests that
the impact of gender varies according to both age and the type
of task (Yilmaz, 2009), which shed some light on the interaction
effect between gender and condition, and between age, gender,
and condition. Thus, one reason for the gender differences in
the dyadic setting may be that this condition depends more on
broader social and language skills, which are dimensions where
girls and older children typically demonstrate better abilities than
boys and younger children (Walker et al., 2002; Siegal, 2008).
More research with a larger age range is needed, however, to
understand why gender differences appear in different conditions
and how they might evolve over time.
The Impact of ToM on Spatial
Performances
The impact of age on ToM performances was expected,
as previous studies have shown that ToM follows a clear
developmental trend, both in boys and girls (e.g., Harris et al.,
2005; Shahaeian et al., 2011). The results originally showed
relations between ToM and spatial performances, both in the
individual and in the dyadic conditions, even when age and
gender were taken into account. Moreover, confirming the
second hypothesis of this study, ToM had a positive impact on the
spatial performance when children worked together, even when
we controlled for age, gender, and spatial performance in the
individual condition.
The link between ToM and the spatial performance in the
individual setting indicates that the abilities to conceptually
understanding the mind in terms of thoughts and emotions
and to cognitively visualize objects in different positions based
on an external frame of reference are related competences. The
findings therefore expand previous results by demonstrating
that understanding mental states has positive consequences
not only on social competences (e.g., Roazzi et al., 2013;
Farina and Belacchi, 2014) and the use of mental terms and
metacognition (Veneziano et al., 2008; Lecce et al., 2010;
Guajardo and Cartwright, 2016), but also on the domain of
children’s cognition with regard to spatial visualization, which is a
spatial transformation where “the positions of objects are moved
with respect to an environmental frame of reference” (Hegarty
and Waller, 2004, p. 127). In the present study it means that
children with higher level of conceptual ToM were better able to
mentally rotate the object and correctly transform the positions
of the houses by taking the lake as the referential mark.
One could argue that once a relation between ToM and
the spatial performance in the individual condition was found,
a relation between ToM and the performance in the dyadic
condition would be expected. Yet, the performance in the two
conditions rely on different levels of spatial skills, as indicated
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by the findings showing the absence of a relation between the
performance in the individual condition (making object-based
transformation) and the performance in the dyadic condition
(coordinating different perspectives). This is in line with the
dissociation between tests of perspective taking and tests of
mental rotation reported by others (Hegarty and Waller, 2004).
Thus, we could not interpret the correlation between ToM
and the performance in the dyadic condition as parallel to
the correlation between ToM and the performance in the
individual condition. It is also noteworthy that the relation
between ToM and spatial performance was stronger in the
dyadic compared with the individual setting. Moreover, beyond
examining how ToM and the spatial performance in the dyadic
condition were related, our aim was to investigate the degree
to which ToM abilities could explain variation in the spatial
performances in a social interaction setting. It was only ToM
that significantly explained the performance in the Spatial task
when children worked together, while the children’s age or
their previous experience with the task did not. This finding
therefore suggests the existence of socio-cognitive mechanisms
underpinning spatial performance in social interactions.
A comparison of the two conditions of the Spatial task might
deepen our understanding on such socio-cognitive mechanism.
When resolving the task alone children had to visualize the
houses in different positions by taking the lake as a reference.
Even when the child changed the position to see the cardboard
from a different angle (intra-individual conflict), the task in the
individual setting centered around object-based transformations,
while in the dyadic setting they needed to go beyond their own
spatial visualization and deal with the other’s spatial perspective.
In fact, the performance in the dyadic condition of the Spatial task
seems to be more strongly dependent on the performance on the
ToM tests where the child also had to take the mental perspective
of the character. Thus, one could argue that a link between
ToM and the spatial performance in the dyadic setting would
be expected because the Spatial task in the dyadic condition
essentially demands perspective taking. Nevertheless, the task in
the dyadic condition cannot be reduced to its perspective taking
dimension as the children also needed to manage the object-based
transformation while coordinating different viewpoints with the
other child, which is an advanced form of cognitive problem.
In addition, we used a broad measure of ToM that assessed
not only perspective taking but also false-belief and emotion
comprehension, in which – different from the Spatial task –
children’s beliefs and perspectives were not confronted by the
experimenter or another child. Thus, the main explanation is
that the findings add a new factor to the previous results on
the reconstruction of the village task (e.g., Doise and Mugny,
1984; Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012) by pointing out that the better the
child is at conceptually theorizing about the mind in a fictional
scenario in terms of beliefs, perspectives, and emotions, the better
he mentally rotates the objects while taking the spatial perspective
of a real partner.
The current findings can therefore shed new light on the link
between conceptual understanding of the mind and its practical
implication for children’s cognition, especially for cognitive
performance in social interaction. According to Tversky and
Hard (2009), seeing another person in a scene near objects
can elicit spontaneous perspective taking, which, in turn, create
mutual expectations between partners while attempting to
coordinate actions, imposed each person to go into multiple levels
of perspectives. Nevertheless, Keysar et al. (2000) showed that
even adults with high levels of ToM can demonstrate difficulties
in applying these abilities to take other’s perspective. Accordingly,
Samson and Apperly (2010) argue that using ToM could be
a cognitively costly process involving the need to resist the
interference from the egocentric perspective and to select relevant
information necessary for ToM inferences, potentially creating
a gap between competence and performance. We should point
out some distinctions between the previous and the current
findings. Notwithstanding the differences in age ranges, the
aforementioned studies focused on perspective taking, while we
have assessed a broad measure of ToM. This might suggest
that the implication of ToM for children’s spatial performances
cannot be seen as a uniform fact, as it can vary depending on the
age range of the participants, how ToM is measured and what
context it is applied in. A broad measure of ToM is potentially
accounting for more variability in spatial performances than
measures of perspective taking or false-belief alone, especially
when the task is spatial and social at the same time (i.e., the
village task). Perhaps a broad measure of ToM that includes
the understanding of beliefs, desires, and emotions is part of a
broader socio-cognitive process underlying spatial and social-
perspective taking. In light of findings suggesting that social
abilities are related to a more visually driven form of perspective
taking (Clements-Stephens et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 2014),
future studies analyzing how children consider the other’s point
of view while cooperatively resolving a spatial problem may
contribute to understanding the extent to which and how ToM,
social perspective taking and spatial performance are intertwined.
In sum, our results showed that conceptual competence can
account for variation in cognitive performances on a Spatial
task in children between 5–9 years of age, and in particularly
so when the ToM measure includes different concepts. This
does not indicate that we can directly translate ToM competence
into spatial performance, and future studies should examine the
role of potential third variables, such as language, cooperative
behavior, intelligence, and executive functions (Wellman, 2014)
to have a more complete picture of the role of ToM on spatial
performance. As for now, the findings illustrate that, although
not sufficient (Astington, 2003; Samson and Apperly, 2010),
higher ToM levels can have positive implications for cognitive
performances in terms of mental rotation and spatial perspective
taking during peer interaction.
Limitations
Some limitations should be mentioned. A larger sample size
would have provided more power to detect significant relations
and group differences in the present study. The inclusion of
a post-test section (Doise and Mugny, 1984) would inform
on possible long-term effects of the dyadic experiences. Future
studies could also apply a longitudinal approach to address
potential developmental processes. In addition, training studies
aiming at strengthening ToM competences might provide
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stronger evidence of the positive impact of ToM on spatial
performances. Inclusion of additional ToM concepts, as well as
examination of the contributions of the separate components
of the TEC and TMT could also contribute to a deeper
understanding of the role of ToM on cognition.
Another limitation is that we did not analyze the interactional
processes in the dyadic setting. Zapiti and Psaltis (2012), for
instance, showed that what happens in the interaction affects
the final spatial performance. In addition, Caputi et al. (2012)
underlined that the relation between having and using ToM
in social interaction is mediated by social factors. It could be
argued that having the same intention toward the task does
not specify the kind of social relation children would establish
(Thomsen and Carey, 2013) and that different dyadic profiles,
either more unilateral/hierarchical or more cooperative could
affect performances in dyadic settings (Psaltis and Duveen, 2007).
Thus, investigating the process of how children interact and
operate with the socio-cognitive conflict could help to better
understand how ToM explains the spatial performance in the
dyadic Spatial task. Last, but not least, it is not certain that the
same results would have occurred in other type of cognitive
problem or if the spatial abilities were examined in a non-
structured task. Investigating the impact of ToM in everyday
interaction could deepen our understanding on the implication
of ToM for children’s cognition with regard to the nature of the
task and the nature of the interaction.
CONCLUSION
Both hypotheses of the current study were confirmed: (1)
children performed better in the dyadic setting compared to when
doing it by themselves; and (2) children’s ToM had a positive
impact on the spatial performance in the dyadic condition.
Theoretically, these findings add a new aspect to the explanations
based on inter-individual conflict and action-based reasoning
(Doise and Mugny, 1984; Tversky and Hard, 2009; Zapiti and
Psaltis, 2012) by illuminating socio-cognitive mechanisms that
link conceptual competence in understanding the mind with
spatial performance within interactional settings. The results
demonstrate that individual differences in ToM – not only in
terms of false-belief or perspective taking, but also in terms of
emotion comprehension – impact children’s cognition and have
to be taken into account in order to get a more complete picture
of what promotes spatial performances in social interactions.
Hence, three practical implications can be derived from it. First,
it implies the need to elaborate more adequate and sensitive
measures to grasp the cognitive consequences of ToM in a
wide range of interactional contexts. Second, pedagogues might
need to consider children’s ToM abilities when composing dyads
and groups to solve spatial problems in cooperation, as such
grouping might yield different outcomes. Finally, the findings
suggest that teaching and strengthening of children’s ToM
competences can have positive impact on children’s cognitive
performance in important settings, such as in school, at least
when it comes to spatial problems. To conclude, the link between
what ToM is and what ToM is for (Liszkowski, 2013) does not
indicate that ToM concepts are sufficient to efficiently promote
successful cognitive outcome in social interaction (Astington,
2003). However, it shows that having such concepts goes beyond
conceptual knowledge and can have practical implications for
children’s cognition. This study demonstrates how this is the case
in the domain of spatial transformation in peer interaction.
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